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CASE SUMMARIES
LUCK'S MUSIC LIBRARY V. ASHCR OFT
321 F. SUPP. 2D 107 (2004)
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 10, 2004, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia dismissed a claim rooted in intellectual
property law. Plaintiffs, Luck's Music Library, Inc. ("Luck's
Music") and Moviecraft, Inc. ("Moviecraft"), brought suit alleging
that Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
("URAA") which amended 17 U.S.C. § 104(a), was
unconstitutional.' Defendants John Ashcroft, Attorney General of
the United States, and Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights,
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to
state a claim on which relief can be granted in accordance with
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).2
II. FACTS
Plaintiffs filed their complaint on October 29, 2001, asking for
declaratory and injunctive relief; they claimed that the statutory
amendment was unenforceable.' On February 15, 2002, the
defendants moved to dismiss the instant case for failure to state a
claim on which relief can be granted.4 Both parties requested to
stay the case pending the Supreme Court's ruling in Eldred v.
Ashcroft,' a copyright case. The court granted the request.6 After
1. Luck's Music Library v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d. 107, 109 (2004).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 111.
4. Id.
5. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
6. Luck's Music Library, 321 F. Supp. 2d. at 111.
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the Supreme Court decided Eldred v. Ashcroft,7 both parties filed
supplementary briefs addressing Eldred's effect on the issues in
the instant case.8 The court then turned to the defendants' motion
to dismiss.9
A. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA)
Section 514 of the URAA gives practical effect to Article 18 of
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works. " The Berne Convention protects foreign copyrights by
holding that State Parties must provide foreign copyright holders
the same copyright protection that given to domestic copyright
holders. 1
Section 514 also restores protection to foreign copyrights that
fall into the public domain in the United States as long as the
foreign copyright remains protected in its country of origin. 2
Foreign works may enter the public domain in the U.S. for reasons
including: (a) failure of the foreign copyright holder to comply
with the United States' copyright formalities, (b) absence of prior
subject matter protection such as sound recordings fixed before
1972, or (c) failure of the United States to recognize copyrights
from that country. 3 However, parties who rely on a foreign
work's public domain status before its renewal in the United States
will also find a degree of protection under Section 514.4
1. Luck's Music Library
Luck's Music sells and rents orchestra sheet music to orchestras
7. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
8. Luck's Music Library, 321 F. Supp. 2d. at 111.
9. Id.




14. Luck's Music Library, 321 F. Supp. 2d. at 110.
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and symphonies around the world.'5 All of the works that Luck's
Music distributes have fallen into the public domain under U.S.
copyright law.' 6  Many foreign countries refuse to provide
reciprocal copyright protection for U.S. copyrights and much of
Luck's Music's inventory consists of music originally composed
and published in these nations.'7 Because these foreign nations
refuse to provide copyright protection to U.S. copyrights,
copyrights from these nations remain unprotected under U.S.
copyright law.'" After the passage of Section 514, Luck's Music
received several notices of intent to enforce copyright, demanding
that it refrain from selling two to three hundred different works
from Russian composers because the passage of Section 514
restores copyright protection to the works. '"
2. Moviecraft
Moviecraft, a joint plaintiff, archives and preserves films dating
back to the early 1900s.2" It creates and sells copies of the works
and also creates derivative works of the originals.2' Many of the
films it used were in the public domain. However, Section 514
restored copyrights to many of the foreign works that Moviecraft
obtained and restored.22 As a result of this copyright restoration,






20. Luck's Music Library, 321 F. Supp. 2d. at 110.
21. Id. at 110-11.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standards for Rule 12(b)(6) and Interpretation of the IP
Clause
Turning to the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court
addressed Federal Rule 12(b)(6), which examines the plaintiffs
ability to succeed on the merits of its case. 24 To succeed on the
motion, the defendant must show that the plaintiff cannot prove a
set of facts that would entitle him or her to relief. 25
The court next determined how to interpret the Intellectual
Property (IP) Clause of the United States Constitution.26 The court
noted that the IP clause allows Congress "to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts," by securing exclusive rights to authors
and inventors for a limited period of time.27 The court also
deferred to Congress on its policy decisions in copyright law.28
B. The Court Concludes That Section 514 Does Not Exceed
Congress's Power Under the IP Clause
Luck's Music claimed that the enactment of Section 514,
granting retroactive copyrights to certain works, violated the IP
clause.29 It asserted that the IP clause assures that the public will
have absolute access to works in the public domain."
24. Id. (citing Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002))
25. Id.
26. Luck's Music Library, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 112. See also U.S. Const. art I,
§ 8, cl. 8.
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1. Congress Has Traditionally Exercised Restorative Copyright
Powers
The defendants asserted that the Copyright Act of 1790
established retroactive copyright.3" They also asserted that
retroactive copyrights have repeatedly been enforced through
presidential declarations.32 The plaintiffs argued that the 1790 Act
only codified a state-based statutory copyright or a common law
copyright if the state did not have a copyright statute.33 A review
of state statutes before the ratification of the constitution and the
enactment of the 1790 Act revealed that the plaintiffs' argument
was flawed."4
a. Congress Created Retroactive Copyrights by Enacting
the 1790 Act
The court noted that, historically, the responsibility to pass a
copyright statute fell to each state.35 Luck's Music. argued that a
common law copyright existed for states that did not have a
copyright statute in effect.36 The plaintiff also claimed that by
enacting the 1790 Act, Congress created statutory law out of
common law rights.3 7 However, the court noted that a common
law copyright did not exist in the United States.3" The Supreme
Court had interpreted the words "by securing" in the IP Clause as
allowing Congress to make new rights out of the 1790 Act.39 Any
other interpretation would make the IP Clause repetitive and
31. Id. at 113.




36. Id. at 114.
37. Id.
38. Luck's Music Library, 321 F. Supp. 2s at 114. In Wheaton, the Court
interpreted the words "by securing" in the I.P. clause to mean that the
constitution gave Congress the power to create a new right through the 1790
Act. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 662 (1834).
39. Luck's Music Library t, 321 F. Supp. at 114.
20051
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meaningless because it would grant a right that was already in
existence. 4
b. The 1919 Amendment and the Emergency Act of 1941
that Allowed Copyrights to be Restored Shows Congress'
Consistency
The court analyzed Luck's Music's next argument which
contended that the presidential proclamations only applied to
copyright holders who could not meet statutory formality
requirements during times of war. 41  The defendants, however,
rebutted with the argument that presidential proclamations did
more than provide more time for complying with U.S. copyright
formalities. 42 The plaintiffs claimed that they allowed authors to
obtain copyright protection for works that had already fallen into
the public domain.43
The court next examined the legislative history of the
presidential proclamations. An Act to Amend Sections 8 and 21 of
the Copyright Act, 41 Stat. 368 (1919) ("1919 Amendment") and
the Emergency Copyright Act of 1941, 55 Stat. 732 (1941)
("Emergency Act"),44 allowed the president to restore copyright
protections through proclamations, 45 and thus reestablish copyright
protection for foreign authors.46 The foreign works had to be
published within a certain time window and conform to U.S.
formalities.47 Thus, both acts demonstrate Congress's practice of
restoring copyrights.48  Moreover, both acts allowed foreign
authors to regain copyright protection for their works if the works
40. Id. at 114.
41. Id. at 113-14.
42. Id. at 114.
43. Id.
44. Stat. 368-69 (1919), 55 Stat. 732 (1941).
45. Luck's Music Library, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 114-15 (citing an Act to amend
Sections 8 and 21 of the Copyright Act, 21 Stat. 368 (1919); Emergency
Copyright Act of 1941, 55 Stat. 732 (1941)).
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had fallen into the public domain under United States law.49
Luck's Music argued that these statutes did not restore
copyright, but they failed to account for the 1919 Amendment
provisions and the Emergency Act.5' Both of these oversights
gave protection to those who relied on the public domain status of
certain works before the proclamations restored their copyrights.5'
Congress's intent, evident in the House Report on the Emergency
Act, allowed restoration of retroactive copyrights.5 2  Thus, the
court concluded that Congress's past actions show a clear history
of allowing retroactive copyrights. 3
2. The Plaintiffs Improperly Rely on Caselaw Interpreting Patent
Law
The court rejected Luck's Music's argument that the
Constitution's IP Clause has a public domain limitation. 4 Citing
Graham v. John Deere Co., plaintiffs contended that the IP Clause
does not allow Congress to grant copyrights to public domain
works.55 The government argued that Graham did not apply
because the nature of patents differed from copyrights with regard
to retroactive protection. 56 The court agreed with the
government.57
The court concluded that Graham did not apply to the instant
case. 58 In Graham, the Supreme Court focused on the patent
statute's novelty requirement, which differs considerably from the
copyright statute's originality requirements.59 Specifically, the
Supreme Court noted in its decision that the copyright aspect of
49. Id.
50. Luck's Music Library, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 115.
51. Id. (citing 41 Stat. at 369; 55 Stat. at 732).
52. Id. at 116.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966)).
56. Luck's Music Library, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 116.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 116-17.
2005] 427
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the IP Clause had nothing to do with their decision in Graham.6"
By contrast, the court noted that the copyright statute does not
contain a novelty requirement.6 Thus, Luck's Music's claim that
Graham prevented Congress from giving copyright protection to
public domain works lacked authority,62 and its reliance on
Graham was misplaced.63
3. Section 514 Allows for the Promotion of Science
The court next addressed the plaintiffs' claim that Section 514
violates the preamble of the IP clause because it fails to "Promote
the Progress of Science."'  The defendants countered that the
Constitution gives Congress the ultimate authority on the
progression of science and, therefore, the court need only conclude
that Congress acted rationally to promote science in enacting the
statute. 65
Courts have never determined that the phrase, "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts" in the IP Clause limits the
power of Congress.66 Congress enacted Section 514 to ensure that
U.S. copyrights would be protected in foreign countries.67
Industry losses due to piracy amounted to $43 and $61 billion
because of "inadequate [foreign] legal protection for United States
intellectual property" and the U.S. Senate stated that Section 514
"is a significant opportunity to reduce the impact of copyright
piracy on our world trade position. ' 68  Accordingly, the court
concluded that Section 514 promotes science.69




64. Id. (citing U.S. Const., Art I, §8, cl. 8).
65. Luck's Music Library t, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 117.
66. Id. at 117, (citing Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 111-112 (D.C. Cir.
1981)).
67. Id.
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4. Section 514 Does Not Violate the Originality Requirement
Luck's Music claimed that Section 514 violated the Act's
originality requirement because it pulled works out of the public
domain.7" The plaintiff also argued that once an author publishes a
work, that work loses originality.7 Luck's Music asserted that the
retroactive grant of a copyright is equivalent to granting a
copyright in an unoriginal work. Thus, the protection violates the
originality requirement.72 Moviecraft contended that the Supreme
Court in Eldred concluded that "originality depends on the work's
originality to the author at the time of creation, and therefore
preempts the plaintiffs' argument."73  In this case, the works to
which Section 514 restores copyrights are already consistent with
the originality requirement because "Section 514 only applies to
works that would be eligible for copyrights if not for the United
States' formalities requirement, the lack of subject-matter
protection, or lack of national eligibility."74 Thus, works to which
Section 514 retroactively grants copyrights are already sufficiently
creative to obtain copyright protection,75 and Section 514 does not
violate the originality requirement in the IP Clause.76
5. Section 514 Does Not Violate the First Amendment
Finally, Luck's Music claimed that Section 514 violates the First
Amendment because it forbids the public from using works
already in the public domain, a freedom of expression violation.77
Defendants argued that Eldred bars this argument, and the court
agreed." The court found that by offering an economic incentive,
70. Id.
71. Luck's Music Library, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 117-18.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 118 (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221).
74. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. §104A(h)(6)(c)(i)-(iii)).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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"the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free
expression."79 When copyright protection raised First Amendment
issues, copyright law already accommodated the First Amendment
through the idea/ expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine.8"
When Congress "has not altered the traditional contours of
copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is
unnecessary."'"
Section 514 supplemented First Amendment guarantees because
it protects parties who already have taken advantage of the
restored copyrighted work when it was in the public domain.82 In
addition, Section 514 allowed the continued exploitation of
derivative works as long as the restored copyright holder obtains
adequate compensation.83 Thus, Section 514 does not subjugate
traditional copyright protections and offers additional ones. 14 The
instant case did not require First Amendment scrutiny.85
IV. CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs brought suit alleging that Section 514 of the
URAA was unconstitutional.86 The court disagreed and granted
the defendants' motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs failed to
state a claim on which relief could be granted, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).87 The plaintiffs claimed that the enactment of
Section 514 violated the IP clause because it granted retroactive
copyrights to certain works.88 The court denounced this argument,
stating that Congress has traditionally exercised retroactive
79. Id. (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 558, 105 S. Ct. 2218, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 119 (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-21).
82. Id.
83. Luck's Music Library, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 119.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 109.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 112.
430
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copyright powers.89  The plaintiffs next argued that the
constitution's IP clause has an implicit public domain limitation,
an argument that the court rejected.9" The court concluded that the
plaintiffs' reliance on patent case law to illustrate the public
domain limitation was misplaced.9  The court then rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that Section 514 hinders the promotion of
science because it found that Section 514 has a rational
relationship to the promotion of science,92 noting that the court
rejected plaintiffs' argument that Section 514 violates the IP
clause's originality requirement.93 The court noted that the works
that were granted a retroactive copyright already contained the
level of creativity necessary for copyright protection.9 4 Finally,
the court concluded that Section 514 does not violate the First
Amendment because, in offering an economic incentive, the
Framers intended copyright to fuel free expression."5
Amanda Roach
89. Luck's Music Library, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 113.
90. Id. at 116.
91. Id. at 117.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 117-18.
94. Id.
95. Luck's Music Library, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 117-18.
4312005]
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